My impression is that successful projects belong to the same people, the kind of people who recognize problems and deploy countermeasures more effectively than others. In order to be successful at what they develop, these people apply far more than a single model not only to detect problems and identify countermeasures, but to plan. One of these models-a model that we all employ, consciously or not-I've called the development system.
• Volume. It's harder to handle 10,000 things than 100. Will something that works for 100 requirements work for 10,000? The same question applies to defects, builds, target platforms, and test cases.
• Process capacity. Is it possible to process the required volume in the time available?
• Concurrency. How many people or events are in process at once?
• Cycle time. Will the individual processes execute quickly enough for the project to meet its schedule.
• Operations. These are attribute requirements-like availability and reliability-which can make transformations impossible. Can we run it enough to get the job done? (On BSY-2 the initial production timeline for some deliverable documents exceeded the mean time between failures for the host platform. Tuning and some redesign reduced this timeline by a factor of almost 1,000. Allowing greater concurrency, got us a total improvement on the order of 10,000. This scaling was never possible on the workstations, and the MTBF was worse.) • Deployment. How broadly is it available? Can we get each function of the development system to everyone who needs to use it? • Process measures. Any process in the development system has performance measures, like precision and repeatability. What are the process performance measures the development system has to meet? Overdesigning for a performance measure can be as bad as underdesigning for it.
For any particular project, the limiting process probably isn't what you think. Often, it's a control process. And for any particular process, the most important attribute probably isn't what you think either. Often, it's cycle time or concurrency, versus more obvious attributes.
By not considering the development system as a system, projects can either make the error of assuming that development system performance is a given or can fail to define the development system performance needed. Many projects make both errors simultaneously. When a project is in trouble, that's a good place to look. What is the limiting process? What are the important attributes of the processes in the development system? Is the development system being consciously created, or just accepted?
The Development System is a System Some years before BSY-2, I built embedded controls for heat pumps. (The career transition makes sense; really it does.) We made a number of changes to the development system model in this period, just as relevant for this solo, and small-team development:
• We implemented reliable builds through scripting in the host's shell language. Build precision and repeatability went way up and we spent much less time searching for build bugs.
• Automated builds became nightly builds and eventually used a repeatable procedure for pushing the results out to the target system. We stopped forgetting what had changed. (An experienced developer who joined our small team once suggested that automated builds, and nightly builds were overkill. The whole team shouted the poor guy down, mainly because of how it simplified tracking changes.) • We introduced design reviews prior to coding, and it greatly reduced design defects. However, we used only optional, informal reviews of bug fixes because errors and missed alternatives were rare enough without them.
This last change-design reviews-illustrates something that purists will probably object to. For these systems (high-volume embedded controls) designed in this way (a very decoupled design) with this team of bright, responsible individuals, there was no benefit to requiring team design reviews of fixes. In part, this was because of the knowledge base built up by the earlier design reviews. Most defects were implementation errors. When there was a larger problem, or someone felt uncomfortable with a fix, we dealt with it in our regular meetings, or with informal reviews, both at the fixer's request.
Using the Model
My favorite piece by James Bach is " Process Evolution in a Mad World" (http://www.stlabs.com/testnet/docs/process.htm). The discussion his argument produced on newsgroups (and elsewhere) matters even more, I think. One of the observations from this discussion is that different problem domains require different balances between process control (which the advocates call " discipline" and " maturity" ) and openended problem-solving.
Large-scale tactical systems are embedded in and intertwined with hardware, procurement, facilities, training, and doctrine. Changes to software function have tremendous secondary costs with these system. These costs of change begin to accrue well before the early states of development. Embedded systems for commercial products have a similar level of external cost coupling, but the secondary costs are lower and start a bit later. Commercial heat pumps use existing production, distribution, and support to a greater degree than major new weapons systems. Put another way, for the control systems more of the cost of change was inside the box we shipped, so we could use a less extensive and less robust process to manage the secondary costs of change. We could also tolerate more change later in the game simply because change was cheaper.
On BSY-2, the support tools we built directly implemented parts of the development system. These tools had minor secondary costs of change compared to either the tactical system or embedded controls. Many of the procedures set up to manage the secondary costs of tactical system change were inappropriate for tool development. In addition, these processes assumed that analysis could predict problems-hardly true in terra incognita. When you're taking the tools somewhere they haven't been before, it's usually cheaper to try them and see what breaks.
As Bach suggests in his article, development should be exploratory and evolutionary. Our goal should be to design development to make opportunities for discovering value that the system might have, versus just increasing the performance in delivering the value the system is supposed to have. I'm sometimes a bit more of a formalist than Mr. Bach. I think development should be exploratory some of the time, not all of the time. Sometimes the costs of exploration are just too high. That said, I think as a profession we err toward too much definition, and miss opportunities to intentionally design down the costs of exploration. Often we design, or accept a development system that makes exploration and evolution prohibitively expensive, when there is no direct external reason to do so.
Since BSY-2, I've been exposed to enterprise-scale IT systems, which require a different relationship to the organization they support than products (like tactical systems, design specs, embedded controls, or shrink-wrap packages) have to the company that sells them. The differences in that relationship are most apparent in the requirements on the development system. For example, with very large IT systems, deployment is often the critical process (in the development system), and deployment robustness, timing, and coverage are often the critical attributes. Using a methodology that omits this process can lead to an incomplete development system, and project failure. We can build the functions just fine, but can't get them out to the people who must use them.
Different Situations / Different Development Systems
Different situations will require very different performance from the development system in terms of measurable attributes like volume, scale, and cycle time. Different situations will also require different emphasis on adaptability versus repeatability, control versus communication, and so on. To be successful, the development system must sometimes be profoundly different between projects. Certainly between types of systems: Building tactical systems is not like embedded controls, which are not like large IT systems, and so on.
• Any particular development system is good at some things and bad at others, which may or may not fit what a particular project needs.
• The most important development system performance measure is situational. It depends on what is being built.
• The mechanical requirements of the development system are pretty easily addressed. How many defects can we have and how quickly do we have to do builds? The policy and procedure issues are more subtle and prone to dogmatism.
• Maturity approaches trade some measures (throughput) for others (repeatability).
Successful project managers don't take the development system as a given, but rebuild it situationally to provide what their project needs. As a profession, we could all benefit by explicitly considering the development system we each have and how it applies to the project at hand. We could use tools and techniques from systems development itself to define and characterize the development system we need. Successful project managers do this kind of planning, in addition to the official PERT / Gantt project planning. It's part of why they succeed.
I think most software engineering techniques are really about changing the performance of the development system. But useful performance is situational. A truly useful change to the development system means it is useful in a particular case for a particular target system. In other words, we should measure usefulness by what it takes to solve the problem at hand, not by some general ideal development system, applicable to all efforts. There is no such animal. The tools group and the embedded control team I've described both abandoned known 'good' practices-and they were right to do so in those situations. They traded off one aspect of development system performance for a more important, meaning more relevant one. That was part of their success.
Improving the development system isn't as simple as improving development quality by reducing defects through reviews. Reducing defects may come at the price of fewer experiments or fewer new values from a system. What's it worth, and what does it cost? ❖ James Bullock is Principal Consultant at Rare Bird Enterprises, where he develops methods and models for building successful systems. Contact him at jbullock@rare-bird-ent.com.
